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The Wall Street Journal
August 31, 1999
To Make Amends for Waco,
Pardon the Branch Davidians
By Alan A. Stone,
Professor of both law and
psychiatry at Harvard
University.
In the wake of the conflagration at the Branch
Davidian compound in
Waco, Texas, the Justice Department assembled a panel
of 10 experts in
religion, law enforcement, counterterrorism and
psychiatry to make
recommendations about how to deal with future Wacos.
At our first
meeting, on July 1, 1993, we discovered that Justice
had no intention of
telling us what had actually happened during the
first raid, by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the subsequent FBI
siege and the final
tank/gas assault that sparked the inferno in which
some 75 people died,
among them at least 20 children. The Justice
Department's investigation was
still under way, and the panelists were told that
questions about what
actually happened were out of order.
Justice officials did tell us
they had convincing
evidence that the Branch
Davidians had killed
themselves, and they expected
the panel to
make that the premise of our
report. The other
panelists accepted the Justice
Department's
rules. I could not. As a
physician, I felt I was
being asked to render a
diagnosis and
prescribe a treatment without
being allowed to
take a history or examine the
patient. I kept
asking questions; the Justice
Department kept
refusing to answer.
It was my view that if the U.S.
government
wanted to avoid future Wacos, it would be necessary
to understand the
psychology of people like cult leader David Koresh
and his followers. But it
would also be essential to understand the psychology
of the ATF and how
its agents decided on their warlike attack, the
psychology of the FBI and its
decisions to use tanks and gas and, most of all, how
those critical decisions
were monitored and controlled by officials in
Washington. I made this
position clear in a preliminary memorandum to the
Justice Department
outlining all of the questions that needed answers.
There was no response or
acknowledgement; in fact it seemed I had been dropped
from the Justice
Department's panel without notice. Eventually it was
agreed that I would
submit my report at a later date after being given
the opportunity to read the
factual investigation and to ask follow up questions.
The Justice Department's factual investigation, when
it finally arrived, was a
bitter disappointment. It wasn't quite a coverup, but
it foreshadowed the
Clintonian phrase "don't ask, don't tell." When I
asked a senior Justice
Department official why he had not inquired about an
obvious discrepancy
his investigation of the FBI had turned up, he said
he did not believe that
was his job. Apparently no one had asked the hard
questions. The
supposedly independent evaluation, led by Edward
Dennis Jr., concluded
that the operation was a success but all the patients
died.
Attorney General Janet Reno took full responsibility
for the tragedy even
though Mr. Dennis said she had done nothing wrong,
and even though
Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell offered to
resign after Waco,
suggesting that he had played a major role in the
undertaking. The national
media and the American people accepted the idea that
the Waco "wackos"
--who, it must be emphasized, included at least 20
children--had gotten
what they deserved and the government had done
nothing wrong.
Because the Justice Department's published
investigation was so
inadequate, I sent a copy of my preliminary
memorandum to the newly
appointed director of the FBI, Louis B. Freeh, hoping
to break through the
stonewall. Soon the crucial FBI actors were phoning
me with some of the
candid answers that allowed me to write my critical
report. It was obvious
then, as it is today, that the Justice Department
never carried out the
thorough investigation the American people were
promised. Six years after
Waco and four years after Oklahoma City, Americans
are still learning
about lying, overreacting, bad judgement, lawbreaking
and more.
All this is grist for conspiracy theories--but those
theories are misguided.
This is the result not of a government at war with
its people but a tragedy of
errors: religious zealots expecting the Judgment Day,
grandstanding ATF
agents who made Koresh's prophecy come true, a
struggle within the FBI
between mediators and warriors, military advisers who
overstepped their
role--all this taking place as the Clinton
administration was appointing new
and inexperienced people to run federal
law-enforcement agencies.
It was clear in 1993 that Janet Reno had been misled;
she needs to explain
why it has taken her six years to find out just how
much. I do not know
whether the FBI's pyrotechnic devices, which the
bureau has finally
acknowledged, actually started the fire. I do know
that much of the gas was
aimed at the so-called bunker where most of the
children suffocated. I do
not know whether Delta Force military advisers drove
the tanks; I do know
that the tank drivers departed from the agreed-upon
plan and, for reasons
never explained, started crushing the compound. As in
Vietnam, the
government decided to destroy the village in order to
save it.
The facts of Waco are incredibly complicated,
Congress's past
performance gives us no reason to believe it will
straighten it all out. The last
congressional hearings turned into a political circus
with both sides
shamelessly posturing for the cameras.
It is said that the search for justice and the search
for truth eventually reach
the same destination. Perhaps as the Waco survivors
and their families
pursue their civil suit against the government, the
Branch Davidians will at
least get a bit of justice and the American people
will learn the truth. But
there is one truth that should be obvious by now; the
Branch Davidians
were more victims than culprits. They are certainly
not common criminals,
as President Clinton once characterized them.
Seven Branch Davidians who survived the final
conflagration were charged
with violent crimes and are still serving long
sentences in federal prisons.
Mr. Clinton should pardon them. By now he must
realize both that the
government made reckless mistakes at Waco and that
those federal
prisoners were motivated by deeply held religious
convictions. Pardoning
them would have no political value; it may even have
substantial political
costs. But Mr. Clinton should do it--with Ms. Reno's
encouragement. I
believe in their hearts they both know it is the
right thing to do.
© The Wall Street Journal
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